'In this seminal work, Richard Bellamy defends political constitutionalism against legal constitutionalism, contesting the currently fashionable view that democracy and human rights are best protected by judges and formal constitutions rather than by politicians and the ordinary processes of democratic politics. Its uncommon grasp of both theoretical argument and the empirical complexity of actual political systems makes this book a major contribution to the debate on how democracy can be renewed and the current flight from politics arrested.' Andrew Gamble, University of Cambridge
'This new and timely book from one of Britain's leading political theorists is his most important work to date. Providing a robust defence and, indeed, celebration of political constitutionalism Professor Bellamy simultaneously explains what's wrong with legal constitutionalism and offers a valuable corrective to errors in some recent republican writing, which has failed to see that it is to democratic politics, and not to the courts of law, that we must primarily look to secure the republican values of popular sovereignty and non-domination. Coming at a time of considerable constitutional flux in both Britain and the European Union, Political Constitutionalism will be essential reading for political theorists and constitutional lawyers alike.' Adam Tomkins, University of Glasgow; author of Our Republican Constitution (2005)
'In this timely work, Political Constitutionalism, Richard Bellamy presents an original republican re-interpretation and defence of existing representative democratic constitutionalism against the legal constitutionalists, who would give the constitution to the courts, and against the deliberative democrats, who discount majority rule and party competition. It is a major contribution to the debate over democracy and constitutionalism.' James Tully, University of Victoria
'How to guard against abuses of government power? Richard Bellamy argues from the institutional record that we should put our faith in electoral rather than legal process. He offers a powerful challenge that none of us can ignore. And along the way he provides a masterful overview of recent debates around this crucial issue.' Philip Pettit, Princeton University
' broad-ranging and ambitious he does the great service of reminding us of the important role that political actions (such as bargaining and compromising) and political institutions (such as political parties and various electoral systems) have to play as (democratic) alternatives to judicial intervention in the upholding of rights.' Political Studies Review
' an excellent means of exposing brighter law students to high-level political theory and offers a salutary rebuff to lawyers' hubris.' The Times Higher Education Supplement
' offers a thorough-going critique of legal constitutionalism The author's claims are defended by an array of forceful arguments, clearly expounded; and the work provides an impressive overview of current debates over democracy and judicial review No legal constitutionalist could fail to enjoy the stimulating challenge Bellamy's new book provides.' Cambridge Law Journal
'This dense monograph is a timely and very important contribution to contemporary normative debates on democracy Bellamy's outstanding contribution is to demonstrate the implications that the principle of non-domination has for understanding the nature and norms of democracy'. European Political Science
`Richard Bellamy has written a powerful critique of judicial review. At the same time, he has offered a serious, sustained defense of unicameral parliamentary supremacy the array [of arguments] he marshals is impressive, drawing on political science as well as moral, political, and legal theory in his well-researched book ' International Journal of Constitutional Law
' a welcome reminder of how effective the politics of democratic opposition, compromise, representation, and so on are at ensuring the preservation of values that Republicans and the liberal tradition both prize.' Modern Law Review
'This is a complex and sometimes dense argument, which takes considerable trouble to engage with hard cases and to address potential criticisms. In particular, it constitutes a significant contribution to discussion of the institutional requirements of non-domination. Even those who disagree with Bellamy's conclusions will be challenged by his arguments, and will benefit from following his close engagement with a comprehensive range of arguments in legal theory and political philosophy, and the way in which evidence from political science is brought to bear on these debates.' Contemporary Political Thought
