Mein Konto
Login Anmeldung
Alles
Warenkorb
Neuesten Trends
Belletristik
Sachbücher
Kinderbücher
Seltene Bücher
Musik
DVD & Blu-Ray
Kategorie
Wunschlisten
Warenkorb
Alles
Kostenloser Versand
Trustpilot
Unsere Operationen sind klimaneutral

The Mechanisms of Governance Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)

The Mechanisms of Governance von Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)

The Mechanisms of Governance Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)

€8.99
Zustand - Sehr Gut
Nur noch 1
Sehr Gut

Zusammenfassung

Offering a new economic perspective to organizational studies, this work shows that decision-makers in firms respond to economic factors that affect both the structure of the individual firm and the structure of the industry within which the organization operates.

The Mechanisms of Governance Zusammenfassung

The Mechanisms of Governance Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)

New Institutional Economics is a new way to look at how organizations function. Rather than seeing the firm as a black box, Williamson shows how decision makers respond to economic factors WITHIN the firm - what he calls transaction cost economics (TCE). In this series of studies, Williamson shows how complexity expands in organizations because of bounded rationality and opportunism; that is the bad news of his message. The good news is that individuals within organizations become perceptive of resulting hazards they may and do encounter, and are adept at fashioning their organizations to cope creatively with difficult situations. This creativity accounts for diversity among organizations, in which governance structures are adapted to firm - or industry-specific hazards.

The Mechanisms of Governance Bewertungen

These papers have been slightly modified and linking passages have been added to them to impose a sort of unity on them. The book is therefore an extremely convenient collection on the overall theory and some of the applications of transaction cost economics as understood by the leading exponent of those economics ... it is on the understanding of the existence of the firm and its behaviour that he has made his greatest mark ... I believe that what is read will speak for itself and for good law and economics more eloquently than I can manage here. * Journal of Law and Society *

Über Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)

Oliver E. Williamson is the Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of numerous works in which law, economics, and organization are joined.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Prologue ; PART I: OVERVIEW ; 2. Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization ; 3. Transaction Cost Economics ; PART II: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS ; 4. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Strucutural Alternatives ; 5. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange ; 6. Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance ; 7. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance ; 8. The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency ; PART III: ORGANIZATIONS ; 9. Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory ; 10. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization ; PART IV: PUBLIC POLICY ; 11. Delimiting Antitrust ; 12. Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization ; 13. The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform ; PART V: CONTROVERSY AND PERSPECTIVES ; 14. Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics ; 15. Transaction Cost Economics and the Evolving Science of Organization ; Glossary

Zusätzliche Informationen

GOR007722501
9780195078244
0195078241
The Mechanisms of Governance Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)
Oliver E. Williamson (Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, Edgar F. Kaiser Professor of Business Administration, Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley)
Gebraucht - Sehr Gut
Gebundene Ausgabe
Oxford University Press Inc
1996-06-20
442
N/A
Die Abbildung des Buches dient nur Illustrationszwecken, die tatsächliche Bindung, das Cover und die Auflage können sich davon unterscheiden.
Dies ist ein gebrauchtes Buch. Es wurde schon einmal gelesen und weist von der früheren Nutzung Gebrauchsspuren auf. Wir gehen davon aus, dass es im Großen und Ganzen in einem sehr guten Zustand ist. Sollten Sie jedoch nicht vollständig zufrieden sein, setzen Sie sich bitte mit uns in Verbindung.