This book presents a damning analysis of Britain's military involvement in the Iraq conflict. Ministry of Defeat is a devastating account of military and strategic incompetence. When Tony Blair insisted that British Armed Forces form part of the invasion of Iraq, little attention was paid as to how this might work out in practice or what the consequences might be. Here we have for the first time a detailed account of just what an abject failure Britain's military intervention in Iraq has been. The British occupation of south eastern Iraq has lasted six years, a period longer than the Second World War. Despite the astonishing bravery of countless individual soldiers the only real success of the British Government has been to hide from view, thanks to catastrophic misjudgements, this has become one of the most humiliating chapters in British Military History. The British Army leaves Iraq in July 2009, ahead of schedule, and the full story of the campaign needs to be told. Richard North presents in considerable detail one of the most painful and lasting legacies of the Blair era.