This in-depth analysis argues a new perspective on the reconstruction of Iraq The postwar rebuilding effort carried out by the United States in Iraq has been mediocre at best. Numerous books have been published criticizing the government's decision to go to war in the first place, and many have voiced concerns about the lack of planning for the postwar rebuilding process. But David L Phillips, a government insider and leading authority on foreign policy analysis, offers the first argument that there had indeed been a tremendous amount of planning for the postwar rebuilding effort that the government simply chose to ignore. Phillips reaffirms the critiques of US policy in Iraq and goes beyond those in outlining the shortsightedness and imprudence with which the US implemented its plans of restoring Iraqi sovereignty and transferring power to the Iraqis given its decision to go to war. He also documents the much-discussed fallout between the Pentagon and the State Department on managing the postwar effort.