Name: The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism By Dorit A. Ganson
SKU: 9780815339649
Price: 372.29 AUD
Availability: InStock

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism Summary

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism by Dorit A. Ganson

Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies.

About Dorit A. Ganson

Dorit A. Ganson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oberlin College.

Preface; 1. Introduction; I. Explanationism; I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality; I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism; I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism; II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism; II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms; II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism; II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality; III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program; 2. Acausal Models of Explanation; II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model; II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach; III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation; III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements; III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity; III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems; III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance; 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation; I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism; II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments; II.i The Scientific Image; II.ii Laws and Symmetry; III. The Bayesian Peter Objection; III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument; III.ii Flaws in the Argument; III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem; 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books; I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints; II. The Principle of Reflection; III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection; IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions; 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique; I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument; II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism; II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation; II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum; II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package; III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism; 6. The Transcendental Road to Realism; I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism; II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt; III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough; IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules; Appendix; I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification); II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue; Works Cited; Index

Additional information

Sku

NPB9780815339649

ISBN 13

9780815339649

ISBN 10

081533964X

Title

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism by Dorit A. Ganson

Author

Dorit A. Ganson

Series

Studies in Philosophy

Condition

New

Binding type

Hardback

Publisher

Taylor & Francis Inc

Year published

2001-01-25

Number of pages

240

Prizes

N/A

Cover note

Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.

Note

This is a new book - be the first to read this copy. With untouched pages and a perfect binding, your brand new copy is ready to be opened for the first time

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism Dorit A. Ganson

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism by Dorit A. Ganson

Summary

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism Summary

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism by Dorit A. Ganson

About Dorit A. Ganson

Table of Contents

Additional information

Customer Reviews - The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism