Introduction Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge 1: Daniel Dennett, Tufts University: What RoboMary Knows 2: Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham & Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits & Estate Group: So This is What it's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis 3: Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie: The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism 4: Torin Atler, The University of Alabama: Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? 5: Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and Development: What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know About Color? Part II: Phenomenal Concepts 6: Janet Levin, University of Southern California: What is a Phenomenal Concept? 7: David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University: Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts 8: Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst: Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 9: David Chalmers, Australian National University: Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap 10: John Hawthorne, Rutgers University: Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia 11: Stephen White, Tufts University: Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise 12: Ned Block, New York University: Max Black's Ojbection to Mind-Brain Identity 13: Martine Nida-Rumelin, University of Fribourg: Grasping Phenomenal Properties
