PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986 ; (1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986 ; John Moore (University of Edinburgh) ; (2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets ; Bengt Holmstrom (MIT) ; (3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting ; Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) ; (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories ; Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs) ; (5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied Theory ; Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) ; PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries ; (6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions ; Wouter Dessein (Columbia University) ; (7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's ; Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) ; (8) Comment on by Wouter Dessein ; Michael D. Whinston (MIT) ; PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization ; (9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms ; Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics) ; (10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen P. ; John Roberts (Stanford University) ; (11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen ; W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) ; PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance ; (12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control ; Patrick Bolton (Columbia University) ; (13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's ; Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) ; (14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance ; Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) ; PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms ; (15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing ; Josh Lerner (Harvard University) ; (16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital ; Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) ; (17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms ; Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University) ; PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization ; (18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future ; Patrick Legros (Universite libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University) ; (19) Discussion of , by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman ; Mathias Dewatripont (Universite libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium) ; (20) Discussion of , by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman ; Kai-Uwe Kuhn (University of Michigan) ; PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade ; (21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production ; Pol Antras (Harvard University) ; (22) Comment on Pol Antras: ; Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University) ; (23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global ; Dalia Marin (University of Munich) ; PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership ; (24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms ; Paul Grout (University of Bristol) ; (25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart ; Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) ; (26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights ; Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University) ; PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy ; (27) International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts ; Bard Harstad (University of Oslo) ; (28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy ; Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley) ; (29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Constitutions ; Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) ; PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity ; (30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts ; Eric Maskin (Harvard University) ; (31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts ; John Moore (University of Edinburgh) ; (32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design ; Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) ; (33) Complexity and Undescribability ; Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics) ; PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication ; (34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation ; Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne) ; (35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points ; Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich) ; (36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field ; Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)