The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Science contains the most important contributions to the recent philosophical debate on the authority of scientific theory. The contributors ask whether we are justified in believing scientific theories and what attitude we should take to them if we are not. Although few philosophers seriously question the existence of everyday objects like trees and tables, many have real doubts about viruses, electrons, and gravitational waves. The last two decades have seen important new work in the philosophy of science, stimulated by sceptical attitudes towards scientific theories. Scientific realist have in turn countered with arguments of their own, resulting in a wide-ranging debate drawing from many different philosophical disciplines. The Philosophy of Science bridges the gap between both sides of the argument, including articles on different species of realism and anti-realism, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, the lessons of the history of science, naturalized epistemology of science, and Bayesian methodology.