Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgements that express decisions - judgements about what is to be done, all things considered, Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse - between questions of ought and is. Gibbard considers how our actions, and our realities, emerge from the thousands of questions and decisions we form for ourselves. The result is a book that investigates the very nature of the questions we ask ourselves when we ask how we should live and that clarifies the concept of ought by understanding the patterns of normative concepts involved in beliefs and decisions. A work on metaethics, this book aims to bring a new clarity and rigour to the discussion of these tangled issues and aims to significantly alter the long-standing debate over objectivity and factuality in ethics.