Notes on Contributors vii
Preface to the Third Edition xiii
Preface to the Second Edition xiv
Preface to the First Edition xv
Introduction xvii
1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1
Knowledge Comes First 1
Mona Simion
Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7
Aidan McGlynn
Knowledge Still Comes First 14
Mona Simion
Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16
Aidan McGlynn
2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23
Is Justification Just in the Head? 23
Clayton Littlejohn
The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36
Kurt L. Sylvan
3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55
Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55
Matthew McGrath
Suspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66
Jane Friedman
4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79
There Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79
Susanna Rinard
There Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81
Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen
Reply to and Kelly and Cohen 93
Susanna Rinard
5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103
Introductions and Stage-Setting 103
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
A Permissive Notion of Rationality 105
Miriam Schoenfield
We Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Is the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116
Miriam Schoenfield
A Final Plea for Impermissivism 121
Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Some Final Thoughts 123
Miriam Schoenfield
Permissivism and Metaepistemology 124
Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield
6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127
Evidence Is Seemings 127
Michael Huemer
Evidence Is Not Seemings 134
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142
Michael Huemer
Preservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151
Knowing Can Include Luck 151
Stephen Hetherington
There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159
Duncan Pritchard
On Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169
Stephen Hetherington
Reply to Hetherington 171
Duncan Pritchard
8 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175
Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175
Timothy Williamson
The Significance of A Priori Justification 183
Paul Boghossian
Response to Boghossian 191
Timothy Williamson
Reply to Williamson 194
Paul Boghossian
9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201
How to Use Thought Experiments 201
Elijah Chudnoff
A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209
Wesley Buckwalter
How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218
Elijah Chudnoff
Thinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222
Wesley Buckwalter
10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229
Credences Are Degrees of Belief 229
Roger Clarke
Is Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237
Julia Staffel
Two in the Model, One in the Head 247
Roger Clarke
11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253
Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253
Alex Worsnip
Epistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263
J. Adam Carter
A Brief Reply to Carter 274
Alex Worsnip
12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279
A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279
Elizabeth Fricker
Anti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290
Sanford C. Goldberg
Comments on Sanford Goldbergs Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 300
Elizabeth Fricker
Comments on Elizabeth Frickers A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 301
Sanford C. Goldberg
13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305
Skepticism Is Common Sense 305
Allan Hazlett
Skepticism Is Not Common Sense 311
Krista Lawlor
Reply to Lawlor 318
Allan Hazlett
Reply to Hazlett 323
Krista Lawlor
14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329
Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329
Matthew A. Benton
Knowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339
Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Index 355