When the United States government engineered the overthrow of the troublesome South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, it set in motion a tumultuous course of events deepening the Vietnam War. This work asks why President John F. Kennedy decided to depose his ally of nine years, despite almost daily warnings from some cabinet officials that the most likely consequence of a coup would be chaos. Why did Kennedy and his colleagues choose this perilous course in the midst of an uncertain civil war? To answer this question, the author takes the reader inside the Kennedy administration, where the State Department largely supported the coup while the Pentagon and the CIA consistently resisted it. Francis X. Winters's research is based on in-depth interviews with high-ranking members of the Kennedy administration, including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, along with the newly-issued multivolume compilation Foreign Relations and the United States, 1961-1964, Vietnam and the General Records of the US State Department for 1963. The reasons for American support of the coup in Vietnam, Winters asserts, lie both in the ethos of the era, with its dynamic confidence in the superiority of American ideals, and in Kennedy's political aspirations. The book explores the synergy between the idealism and personal ambition that were at the root of America's troubled memories of the war that haunts them still.