Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S. Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix: lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff; 7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems: neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11. Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher; 12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14. Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15. Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise? Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew; 21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy, Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25. Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27. Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28. Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32. Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler; 39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology' Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
