'Dockrill makes use of recently declassified documents in Britain and the United States, as well as interviews, memoirs, and private papers, to provide a more nuanced understanding of the deliberations that resulted in Prime Minister Harold Wilson's decision to withdraw from Britain's major military bases East of Suez in 1967/68. Unlike conventional approaches to this topic, which link the sterling devaluation of November 1967 to the East of Suez decision, Dockrill
argues convincingly that this decision, following several years of protracted Cabinet debates and defense reviews, predated the devaluation by nearly six months.' - James Gump, Department of History, University of San Diego, H-NET BOOK REVIEW
'This ground-breaking monograph will be of immense value to anyone with an interest in the mechanics of decision-making in Whitehall, and should be essential reading for all students of British foreign and defence policy in the twentieth century.' - Keith Hamilton, Senior Editor, Documents on British Policy Overseas
'...an admirable study.' - Keith Robbins, International History Review